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Abstract: The paper investigates whether farm dwellers in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province of
South Africa are subject to a “double exposure”: vulnerable both to the impacts of post-apartheid
agrarian dynamics and to the risks of climate change. The evidence is drawn from a 2017 survey
that was undertaken by the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), which is a land rights
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), of 843 farm dweller households. Data on the current
living conditions and livelihoods was collected on 15.3% of the farm dweller population in the area.
The paper demonstrates that farm dwellers are a fragmented, agricultural precariat subject to push
and pull drivers of mobility that leave them with a precarious hold on rural farm dwellings. The key
provocation is that we need to be attentive to whether the hold farm dwellers have over land and
livelihoods is slipping further as a result of instability in the agrarian economy? This instability arises
from agriculture’s arguably maladaptive response to the intersection of structural agrarian change
and climate risk in post-apartheid South Africa. While the outcomes will only be apparent in time,
the risks are real, and the paper concludes with a call for agrarian policy pathways that are both more
adaptive and achieve social justice objectives.
Keywords: agrarian dynamics; climate change; farm dwellers; livelihoods; precariat; vulnerability;
South Africa
1. Introduction
What place is there for farm dwellers in South Africa’s changing agrarian and climate context?
The uncertainty over this issue is what we intend to engage in this paper. Some things are more
certain, however. Three key features of South Africa’s agrarian economy 24 years into democracy
are the persistence of a racially skewed distribution and structure of land ownership with most rural
people living on state land under traditional authorities and accessing land through (neo-) customary
processes (Hornby et al., 2017 [1]); concentration, centralisation, and integration of agricultural capital
creating a globally competitive but highly capital intensive and labour shedding agro-food regime
(Greenberg, 2015 [2]); and, the ongoing evictions of farm dwellers from commercial farms despite
tenure reform laws, with totals exceeding evictions from a decade prior to 1994 and greater than the
number of beneficiaries of land reform policies (Wegerif et al., 2005 [3]).
The politics of land reform remain contested while consensus on agrarian solutions is elusive. AgriSA,
the national agricultural union representing commercial farmers, claims that the government’s target to
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redistribute 30% of white owned farmland has been achieved (AgriSA, 2017 [4]). However, methodological
critiques (Hall and Cousins 2017 [5]) show that the real figure is closer to 8% (Aliber and Cousins
2013 [6]) and growing populist demands for land expropriation without compensation indicate widespread
discontent with the land ownership distribution. Debates on agrarian futures revolve around the possibility
of expanding rural household use of small plots to generate food and income (Aliber and Cousins 2013,
Hall, 2009a [6,7]), while others (Sender and Johnstone 2009, Hein, 2011 [8,9]) suggest that the dominance of
large scale farmers and agro-food conglomerates (or ‘Big Food’) (Igumbor et al., 2012 [10]) eviscerate the
space for small farm strategies. O’Laughlin et al. [11] argue that “Land reform can therefore be seen as
simultaneously both central and marginal (or ‘necessary but not sufficient’) to meeting South Africa’s crisis
of employment, livelihood and social reproduction . . . ”
This poses serious challenges for South Africa’s attempt to use agrarian reform to confront rising
unemployment, persistent structural inequality, and growing poverty and hunger1, particularly for
farm dwellers, the focus of this paper. Moreover these challenges are exacerbated in the context
of emerging climate change risks. Global warming is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest
environmental, social, and economic threats to sustainable development in the world this century
(Agrawala and Frankhauser 2008, Stern 2008, United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) 2014, Ziervogel and Taylor 2008, Anbumozhi 2009, Kaijage 2011, Turpie and Visser
2012 [12–18]). In South Africa, the mean annual temperatures have increased by at least 1.5 times
the observed global average of 0.65 ◦C over the past five decades and extreme rainfall events have
increased in frequency (Ziervogel 2014 [19]). Both the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and South Africa’s own localized and downscaled assessment models
project warming of about 3–6 ◦C by 2081–2100 (IPCC 2014, Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism (DEAT) 2004 [14,20]). Despite the parallels, there is a disconnect in the literature with agrarian
political economists tending to neglect climate as a factor of change, while the climate change literature
disregards how these changes will intersect with the social dynamics underlying agrarian change. Yet,
climate change could deepen and exacerbate pre-existing historical and current vulnerabilities of the
approximately 2 million (Stats SA 2011 [21]) already vulnerable farm dwellers across the country.
This paper thus investigates the degree to which farm dwellers, their land tenure and livelihoods
are subject to a “double exposure” (O’Brien and Leichenko 2000 [22]); vulnerable to the impacts of
post-apartheid agrarian dynamics and change while their land-based livelihoods are vulnerable to
climate change as are the commercial farm enterprises on which their wage labour and residential
rights depend. The study is innovative in providing extensive data on frequently neglected rural
dwellers, namely those who live on commercial farms that they do not own, and in drawing attention to
their double exposure to a combination of agrarian and climate changes, the livelihood vulnerabilities
that are created, and the particular politics that this generates on farms.
The paper demonstrates that farm dwellers are a “fragmented” (Bernstein, 2010:110 [23])
agricultural “precariat” (Standing, 2011 [24]) that are subject to centrifugal (push) and centripetal
(pull) drivers of mobility that leave them with a precarious hold on rural farm dwellings. The key
provocation of this paper is that we need to be attentive to whether the hold farm dwellers have
over land and livelihoods is slipping further as a result of instability in the agrarian economy2?
This instability, we suggest, arises from agriculture’s arguably maladaptive response to the intersection
of structural and climate change in post-apartheid South Africa. While outcomes will only be apparent
in time, we suggest the risks are real, and the paper concludes with a call for more research, and for
agrarian policy pathways that are both more adaptive and achieve social justice objectives.
1 Food prices in 2016 recorded the highest level of inflation at 11.6% (Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 2017: 14 [25]) while
agricultural production in the KwaZulu-Natal recorded a sixth consecutive contraction in 2016 due to a severe multi-year
drought (ibid, 20).
2 StatsSA (2016 [26]) records a 25.2% decline in “agricultural households” in KwaZulu-Natal between 2011 and 2016,
the highest rate of decline nationally, and followed by North West with 21.6%.
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2. Capital, Climate and the Agricultural Precariat
The contested discourse of a new geological era, in the form of the Anthropocene—in which
anthropogenic climate change is acknowledged to have fundamentally altered our climate system
(Clark 2015, Morton 2014 [27,28])—provides an entry point for a number of issues that re pertinent
to this paper; namely the interconnections between climate, capital and socio-ecological change.
Moore 2017 [29] argues that there is a fundamental Human/Nature dualism at the centre of the
Anthropocene discourse, which “obscures our vistas of power, production and profit in the web of
life”. Instead of the Anthropocene discourse, which begins with Nature as analytically distinct to
a homogenous and abstracted notion of Society, Moore, amongst others (Klein 2014 [30]) proposes the
Capitalocene as a way for understanding the conditions for co-production in the planetary ‘web of
life’, and how capitalism has revolutionised the “co-production of historical natures” (ibid: 599).
Indirectly substantiating this argument, O’Brien and Leichenko 2000 [22] consider processes of
globalisation together with climate change arguing that “on-going processes of economic globalization
are modifying or exacerbating existing vulnerabilities to climate change” (ibid, 221).
Most directly, the connection between highly capitalised, commercial agriculture and climate
change is one of cause and effect: on one extreme commercial agricultural systems are energy-intensive
and fossil-fuel based, and thus contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. Estimates posit that agriculture
and the food system as a whole accounts for between 8.2% (Takle and Hofstrand 2008 [31]) to 29%
(Vermeulin et al., 2012 [32]) of global greenhouse gas emissions, thus further accelerating climate change
(Hewitson et al., 2005 [33]). Moreover, some scholars (Weiss 2013, Van Der Ploeg et al., 2015 McMichael
and Schneider 2011 and Schneider and McMichael 2010 [34–37]) contend that the shift towards a highly
capitalised, mono-culture form of agriculture has constituted a form of maladaptation to ongoing
climate change and associated shifting agro-ecological conditions. Grain production (specifically maize
in Southern Africa and rice in Asia) faces particular adaptation threats due to sensitivity to small
temperature increases (IAASTD, 2009:287 [38]), with small farmers most at risk (ibid). Maladaptation,
according to the IPCC (2014 [14]), is ‘an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing vulnerability but
increases it instead’.3
Yet Moore’s argument is further nuanced regarding accumulation dynamics, where he situates the
capitalist revolution in the co-production of historical natures in the four “cheaps” of Nature—labour4,
food, energy, and raw materials—that have sustained capitalism’s expansion and that are now drawing
to an end. The launch of the green revolution in the 1960s, along with the intensive investment that
accompanied it, was based on the extensive farming of monocultures and supported by a boom in the
agrochemical sector and fossil fuel based mechanization (Capra, 2015 [39]). While the new technologies
supported an exponential growth in agricultural production and increased food supply for a growing
world population (Bernstein 2010 [23]), the assumptions were that the climate would remain stable
and both fossil fuels and water supply would always be abundant and affordable (Capra 2015 [39]).
However, the mounting evidence of climate change and food price volatility (Holt-Giménez a & Altieri
2013, Van Der Ploeg 2013 [40,41]) have shown the limits of these assumptions. Commercial agriculture
is now increasingly faced with prospects of peak fossil fuels, peak fertilizers (Pinock 2010 [42]), falling
water tables in some regions, with risks of food shortages, increasing food prices, and increased
social instability (Raleigh et al., 2015 [43]), as well as global political pressures to curb agriculture’s
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. The spatially uneven distribution of climate change effects
(O’Brien and and Leichenko 2000 [22]) has already resulted in periodic declines in crops yields and
failures in some regions.
3 There is debate about adaptation as a useful concept, however. See, for instance, Atteridge and Remling (2018 [44]) who
suggest that adaptation is redistributing vulnerability rather than reducing it.
4 Cheap labour, according to Moore 2017 [29], was based on the disconnection of indigenous populations from the fold of
‘civilized’ people: what English colonial administrators referred to as the ‘wild’ Irish and the Castilians called the ‘Naturales’
in reference to indigenous Peruvians.
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Of interest with regards to ‘cheap’ labour in South Africa, the dynamics run somewhat
contrary to Moore’s assertion of scarcity, with increasing precarity for an oversupplied labour base.
O’Laughlin et al., 2013:6 [11]) argue that it was apparent in the 1970s “that the system of migrant
labour [in South Africa] had eroded its own conditions of existence”. The subsistence ‘subsidy’ that
household farming in the apartheid ‘Bantustans’ had provided to agricultural and mining wage labour
had been undercut by overcrowding as a result of forced removals and consequent declining farm
production. However, this particular contradiction created the basis for the subsequent emergence of
‘surplus labour’ as people continued to migrate out of rural areas and the need for labour in mining
and manufacturing declined. As a result, “cheap labour was no longer scarce and securing it no longer
required systematic state intervention” (ibid). Furthermore, the growing surplus of labour over the
past 40 years have “narrowed the range of employment-based entitlements, cut flows of remittances
between rural and urban areas, and heightened competition for jobs and access to services” (ibid).
The effect of this surplus labour boom alongside the capitalist restructuring of agrarian social
relations have been far reaching for rural farm dwellers and labourers. Ewert and Du Toit 2005: [45] use
the idea of a “double divide” to characterise the changes in the agrarian structure that have take place
over the past four decades. On the side of capital are farmers “able to profit from the opportunities
offered by international expansion and those who are not”; and, on the side of labour is a growing gap
“between ‘core’ workers and those thrown out by casualization and externalization”. While there is
no reference to what happens to the dynamics internal to the double divide in the context of climate
change, an effect of the double divide has been the growth of a “rural lumpenproleteriat, often residing
in rural, peri-urban or metropolitan shantytowns” (ibid: 317).
Perhaps more accurately, the position of farm dwellers in the face of these trajectories can
be described as something of a rural agricultural precariat. Standing 2011 [24] argues that the
fragmentation of the labour market accompanying globalisation has created a new social class of people
who are ‘habituated’ to precariousness characterised as flexible, insecure and intermittent employment
as well as “uncertain access to housing and public resources”. While the idea that the ‘precariat’
constitutes a specific social class has been thoroughly critiqued for disregarding the (geographically
varied) logic of class domination under capitalism (see Breman 2013, Bernado 2016, Munk 2013 [46–48]),
further theorisation has linked employment precariousness (or ”wageless existence” for Denning,
2010 [49]; ‘footloose labour’ for Breman, 1996 [50]) to eroded conditions of social reproduction
(Hart 2014, Bernstein 2004: 205–6, Bernstein 2003: 210 [51–53]). Tania Li (2010: 67 [54]), in her
essay ‘To Make Live or Let Die’, argues that the deepening condition of precariousness is the result
of a new round of enclosures, leading to the dispossession of large numbers of rural people from
land combined with “the low absorption of their labour, which is ‘surplus’ to the requirements of
capital accumulation”. It is in this sense that we find the term ‘precariat’ a useful conceptual lens
to engage with changing social relations on farms in the rural midlands of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)
province, to which we presently turn. Firstly, however, we set out the KZN context of capitalist
agrarian transformation in South Africa over the past decades.
3. Study Method
The evidence is drawn from a 2017 survey that was undertaken by the Association for Rural
Advancement (AFRA), a land rights NGO that works with farm dwellers in the Umgungundlovu
District of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province. The Umgungundlovu District, which is located in the
midlands area of KwaZulu-Natal (the country’s second most densely populated province), is one of
11 municipal districts that are located on the east coast of South Africa, inland from the port city of
Durban. The District has a population of just over a million inhabitants, 61% of whom are located in
the Msunduzi Local Municipality in the vicinity of the city of Pietermaritzburg (Stats SA, 2017 [55]).
The commercial farm areas are dominantly sugar, forestry and beef with some poultry and diary.
The farm dweller population is estimated to be just under 41,000 people.
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The survey was undertaken as part of AFRA’s Pathways Project, whose objective is to find
pathways for farm dwellers out of poverty.5 The purpose of the survey was three-fold: firstly, to collect
base-line data on farm dweller households in the district in order to update information on the living
and livelihood conditions of farm dwellers across the district; secondly, to provide data that could be
used in longitudinal studies to assess changes to the living and livelihood conditions of farm dwellers;
and thirdly, to provide a GPS location of the interviewed farm dweller households and summary
data on rights to land and services as a record of evidence to be used to adjudicate any arising future
disputes over rights.
Surveys on farms in South Africa are not politically neutral processes of data collection.
The research was planned to be undertaken together with land owners in a single municipal area,
but after landowner structures subsequently withdrew their co-operation, AFRA changed the scope to
a sample of farm dweller households across the District in order to ensure access to a representative
sample. The access to farm dwellers then had to be negotiated through other structures, which included
elected councilors, community development workers, and farm dweller structures. This may have
created some bias in the sample in that the farms more likely to be known to these structures are those
where farm dwellers have reported problems of some kind, but these problems also constitute the
rationale for researching farm dwellers in the first place. A further dimension shaping the sample was
that some land owners prevented the researchers from accessing farms and in one case threatened to
bring trespassing charges.
The sampling method under these conditions was essentially opportunistic and the robustness
of the data depended on the percentage of farm dweller households sampled.6 The survey was
conducted with 843 farm dweller households, which collected data on 6478 individual men, women,
and children, living on 83 farms, and thus comprises an estimated 15.8% of the farm dweller population
in the District. Data was collected on both individuals7 and households8, and analysed accordingly.
The instrument was piloted repeatedly and amendments to the instrument were made on the basis of
research assistants’ experience of administering the survey.
The survey was loaded onto a tablet, and interviews were undertaken by six research assistants
over a six month period, with a subsequent two months for checking and correcting errors.9
Data analysis was undertaken in excel and made available on a limited access website as information
was being updated. Cross-tabulations were run across variables where possible relationships had
been identified through literature or through focus sessions with farm dwellers and AFRA field
staff. In terms of ethics, AFRA was concerned that the collected data not be used by landowners or
government to further erode land and service rights of farm dwellers. The permission of respondents
to be interviewed was thus obtained in every case, and the respondents assured that the data linked
explicitly to their names would not be released without their consent.
5 The pathways include a number of strategies for settling land rights and the providing municipal services and state
housing through multi-stakeholder processes, including with land owners, and different spheres of municipal, provincial,
and national government (see https://afra.co.za/current-focus-areas/).
6 The total number of farm dweller households in the District was calculated from Stats SA (2013 [56]) data which showed
that in 2011 5.28% of South Africa’s population lived in designated “Farm Areas”, and of this population, 76.1% lived on
commercial farms (see Visser and Ferrer, 2015: 8 [57]). Although the census data is old, there is no up to date data that can
be used to calculate the farm dweller population. AFRA thus used these percentages to calculate the population of farm
dwellers living on commercial farms as: 5.28/100 × 76.1/100 × 1,017,763, which amounted to 40,895 individuals.
7 Data collected on individual members of household included educational levels, gender and age, permission to be on the
farm, residence on the farm, income levels and sources of income.
8 The data collected on households included household composition, age and gender characteristics, length of time resident
on farms, use of land for livestock production and cultivation, access to basic needs and services (specifically water, energy,
and housing), succession in relation to housing and perception of relationship to farmer, and whether the municipality
provided services to farm dwellers.
9 The captured data was uploaded daily and verified and accepted by the research team leader twice a week. Errors or
missing data were sent back to research assistants on a weekly basis during data collection, and then again in the seventh
and eighth months when preliminary analysis and data cleaning were being undertaken.
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4. Structural Change and Labour Vulnerability in South Africa’s Agrarian Economy
The structure of South Africa’s agricultural economy is the outcome of history, its persistent effects into
the present, and of changes occuring in the democratic period (Ledger, 2016 [58]). Bernstein (1998: 1 [59])
states that “land and production, poverty and power, are key coordinates of the terrain of the agrarian
question and of prospects of agrarian reform” in South Africa. These “coordinates” are often characterised
as a dualism10, with poverty, overcrowding, and subsistence agriculture in the apartheid-constructed
former ‘Bantustans’ existing alongside the vast, highly capitalised, mainly white-owned commercial farms.
An often-neglected dualism is the persistence of “divisions and stark contrasts within commercial farms . . .
[which] exemplify the twin processes of accumulation and underdevelopment, featuring extreme poverty
(among farm workers and dwellers) in the midst of substantial agrarian wealth in large-scale capitalist
agriculture” (Hall et al., 2013: 48 [60]).
Beyond its apartheid history, what accounts for these changes? Answers are complex, and include
policy changes in the early 1990s resulting in de-regulation (Marais 2011: 124 [9]), the dismantling
of apartheid agricultural marketing boards and monopolies and the withdrawal of government
subsidies (Hall 2009 b [61]), and the reduction of tariffs on agricultural imports that exceeded with
the requirements in 1994 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (Ledger 2016 [58]).
Nicholson (2001 [62]) shows that tariffs on agricultural, forestry, and fishing imports were set at 41.2%
but had been reduced to 2.2% by 1998. The changes meant that South African farmers were, over a very
short period, expected to compete on global markets, and in this “moment of globalisation” (Bernstein
2003:203 [53]) were subjected to conditions of extreme competition and an “export or die” (Andrade
2017 [63]) dynamic. There was a need to adhere to and pay the costs for stringent quality requirements
imposed by these markets (Reardon et al., 2003 [64]), with little support from the South African state
and despite continued subsidies provided to farmers in Europe and the United States (Visser, 2016 [65]).
These new conditions and disciplines have made it difficult for emerging small farmers to gain a secure
foothold (Ledger 2016 [58]).
Capitalist agriculture’s response to the changes has varied. Sections of agrarian capital supported
and lobbied for the changes in the early 1990s in order to open up their access to global markets
(Bernstein 1996 [66]) resulting, amongst others, in expansions of sugar milling corporates and their
commercial models into Africa (Dubb 2016 [67]) and forestry corporates into Europe and the United
States. Others used the opportunities to assert local market dominance, with the rise in ‘Big Food’
dominating the food and beverage sectors (Igumbor et al, 2012 [10]), the emerging dominance of
a small number of retailers and supermarkets (Reardon et al., 2003 [64]), the squeezing out of small
growers from the agro-food system (Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003 [71], and increased expenditure
of rural households on food purchases (D’Haese and Van Huylenbroeck 2005 [72]). However, many
agro-corporates and commercial farmers have not survived the new ‘disciplines’ of competition and
have gone out of business (Visser 2016 [65]), as is evidenced in the declining number of farming units;
in KZN the number of commercial farm units declined rapidly from 6080 in 1993 to 3574 units in 2007.
Accompanying this decline is the growth in the mean size of farms from 668 ha in 2003 to 808 ha in
2006 (Stats SA 2013: 6 [56]).
Genis (2015 [73]) summarises responses to changes in conditions for agricultural production as
follows. Firstly, an expansion and consolidation of production and landholdings, which resulted
in increased concentration in agriculture. Secondly a large degree of centralisation, with vertical
integration into up and downstream value chains. This is less apparent at farm level and most
apparent in the agrochemical and seed sector (e.g., Monsanto, Bayer) although the concentration
10 The notion of a dualism in the agricultural economy is highly contested, with some theorists arguing that the underdevelopment
of the peripheral former TBVC states is the result of capitalist development in the centre (see, for instance, Du Toit 2004 [68];
Cousins 2005 [69]; Legassick and Wolpe, 1976 [70]). As O’Laughlin et al (2010:5 [11]) put it: “the highly ‘dualistic’ but unified
economic structure was articulated with and dependent on the bifurcated colonial polity”.
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at farm level is probably a response to centralisation beyond the farm-gate. Thirdly, increased
labour productivity, through the systematic application of labour technologies in work processes
and mechanization. These changes have enabled shifts to smaller, more skilled farm labour, with low
skill or seasonal work being undertaken by contracted labour. This reorganisation of labour has
particular pertinence for this paper because it also threatens to snap the connection between farm
labour and access to land (Hall et al., 2013 [60]). Finally, increased production efficiency through the
use of high-yielding plant varieties and production practices, e.g., conservation agriculture, moisture
conservation, and pruning practices.
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal’s agricultural structure reflects key features of the national structures, specifically,
racially skewed land ownership, a decline in contribution to GDP, and a decline in the number of
farming units with an associated increase in the size of farms; together with a restructuring of labour,
which has included an overall decline in jobs and a shift to contract and seasonal work.
In terms of its contemporary land dispensation and agrarian patterns, the KwaZulu-Natal
Agricultural Union (KwaNalu) claims that 46.29% of land in the province is black owned, while only
15.6% is white owned (with about 35.8% of the province’s land ownership unknown) (De Lange 2017;
Groenewald 2015 [74,75]). These statistics include nearly half of the province’s land that is owned by
the Ingonyama Trust Board, which is a public entity. To describe the tenure in these areas as black
ownership is misleading and inaccurate. By contrast, the audit of state owned land undertaken by the
Department of Rural Development and Land reform (2013: 9 [76]) suggests that 50% of the province is
state owned, while 46% is privately owned, with only 4% unaccounted for. The report does not provide
a racial or urban/rural breakdown but does indicate a shift from individual private ownership to
corporate ownership of rural land, and reflects some ownership changes as a result of transfer through
land reform. However, accurate data on the exact racial and class composition of land ownership in
the province and the mechanisms accounting for changes do not exist.
The contribution of agriculture to KZN’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has declined from 4.4%
in 2004 to 2.1% in 2014 (TIPS 2016: 3 [77]), though with a slight increase to 2.3% by 2017 (TIPS 2017 [78]).
Despite this decline, agriculture is nevertheless more important to the provincial economy than
agriculture generally is to the national GDP. Employment in agriculture in the province has fluctuated:
150,000 jobs in 2008, down to a 100,000 in 2011, and up to 148,000 in 2015 (ibid).
The dominant agricultural commodities in KwaZulu-Natal are forestry, sugar, poultry and beef
production. Forestry uses 5.5% of KZN’s total land (exceeded only by Mpumalanga Province at 6.3%).
Although a relatively low user relative to 12.7% used for arable production, 58.3% for grazing, and 15.1%
used for nature conservation (Godsmark 2013 [79]), forestry in KwaZulu-Natal makes up a significant
proportion of the national forestry hectorage, expanding from 36.8% in 1979/80 to 39.9% in 2015/6.
While forestry’s contribution to national agricultural GDP has risen from about 4 to 10% (although declining
from just above to below 1% of national GDP), its contribution to manufacturing GDP through processing
has declined from approximately 6 to 5%. This drop has been associated with the halving of employment
in the KZN wood and paper industry from approximately 34,000 jobs to 15,000 between 2010 and
2015, the most rapid decline in provincial manufacturing industries over this period (TIPS 2016: 4 [77]).
The drop-off in manufacturing employment could be explained by the diversification and globalisation
strategies of the SAPPI and MONDI forestry corporates, while Mondi has also shifted to a longer term
strategy of leasing rather than owning land subject to land reform (SAPPI 2016 [80]).
Sugar is the provinces second most important agricultural revenue earner after forestry, generating
R2,3 bln in 2007, followed by broilers (R1,7 bln) and beef farming (R1,4 bln) (Stats SA 2007: 11 [81]).
KwaZulu-Natal accounts for 90% of the country’s sugar production (Thornhill et al., 2009 [82]).
The Department of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries (DAFF) (2016 [83]) reports that 318,865 ha (4.8%)
of agricultural land in the province is under sugarcane plantations, a decrease of about 24% from the
2006/07 season, which stood at 419,465 ha (6.3%). Most sugar in the province is grown under dryland
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conditions (SASA 2017 [84]), and hence is vulnerable to climate variability. The sector experienced
a decline in employment that was associated with a decline in output per hectare over the last
two decades due to a combination of factors, including rising input prices, volatile global sugar prices,
drought, and its impact on yields and quality of production, the withdrawal of state subsidies since
the 1990s (EDTEA 2017 [85]), the perceived risks of land reform (Cronje 2015 [86]) and rising labour
costs (Visser 2016 [65]).
The poultry industry (which has a high concentration of broiler chicken production in the
Umgungundlovu District between Cato Ridge and Pietermaritzburg) took a large knock after a trade
dispute saw European goods flood the market (Meyer and Davids 2017 [87]). As the largest agricultural
sub-sector in the country, poultry contributes 16.5% of the gross value of agricultural production, and is
the cheapest and most consumed animal protein source (DAFF, 2016 [83]; Davids and Meyer 2017 [88]),
whereas beef contributed 11.9% and sugar 3.2% of the total value of agricultural revenue nationally in
2015. KwaZulu-Natal has the highest percentage of agricultural households that were engaged in poultry
production (27.5%)11 and vegetable production (30.3%), while the percentage of agricultural households
that were engaged in cattle production (24.5%) is second to the Eastern Cape (Stats SA, 2013 [56]).
In terms of climate risk, Thornhill et al., (2009 [82]) note that KwaZulu-Natal has been subject to
extreme weather episodes at regular intervals over the last 100 to 150 years, and while there are data
gaps that make it difficult to identify trends with surety, these events are likely a part of a continuum
of events whose frequency and severity will increase in the future. The impacts of these events will be
made more severe by the degradation of natural abatement systems, such as floodplains, wetlands,
forested valleys, and coastal dunes. Discussion of further climate impacts are the subject for the
penultimate section, and we now proceed to discuss the survey data on farm dwellers in KZN.
5. Farm Dwellers in KZN as a Rural Precariat
According to the 2011 Census [21], 3.7% of South Africa’s population lives on commercial farms that
they do not own, and yet little is known about the living conditions of farm dwellers. Farm dwellers are
a distinct category of rural dweller, and while there are overlaps with farm workers, to collapse them
into a single sociological category blurs important differences between them. Farm dwellers in this study,
following AFRA’s definition (2017 [89]), include four categories: waged farm workers who have long
histories of living on the farm together with their families; waged farm workers who have recently come
to live on the farm with their families and have no homes elsewhere; migrant farm workers who have
homes elsewhere (often in other countries) but visit them infrequently; and finally, families with nobody
working on the farm, but who have lived many generations on the farm and have no homes elsewhere.12
The 2017 AFRA survey of 838 farm dweller households13 living on 83 farms across the
Umgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal found that the mean size of farm dweller households is
7.2 members, with 55.8% with six or more members, a significantly higher number than the 3.5 members
per household national mean (Wittenberg et al, 2017: 1299 [90]). 35% of household members are
11 Despite the importance of poultry production to the province, none of the farms surveyed in the AFRA data produced poultry.
The majority of interviews took place on farms producing sugar cane (39%) followed by beef cattle (23%) and forestry plantations
(22%).
12 These categories are different from legal categories that include farm occupiers (in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act 62 of 1997) who have rights of occupation linked to employment, farm workers (in terms of the Agricultural Sector, farm
workers (Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 75 of 1997 and Agricultural Labour Act 66 of 1995) who may not be resident on
the farm, and labour tenants (Land Reform Labour Tenants Act 1996) who have access to land for residence and farming in
return for the provision of labour.
13 The definition of household is an important sociological concept as it is key to much demographic research. There are,
however, a number of debated definitions (see, for instance, Amoateng 2007 [91]). In this paper, we follow the definition
used by Wittenberg et al., (2017 [90]), of the household as both a social entity (as in family) and residential unit. The social
entity allows investigation of family members who are absent but who consider the residential space to be ‘home’, while the
physical residence is the site for service delivery, including housing, electricity, water, and sanitation. These aspects of farm
dweller existence are all covered in the AFRA survey.
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younger than 18 years, 52.1% are female and the remainder male, with slightly more men between the
ages of 18–35 (50.9%) than women of the same age.
Farm dwellers secure incomes from multiple sources, including wage work on farms and off
farms, social grants, remittances and own enterprises. However, rising unemployment and labour
casualisation on farms (identified above) combined with declining work opportunities in rural and
urban secondary and tertiary sectors, declining access to land for farming and high numbers without
access to social grants means that farm dwellers, and particularly young men, struggle to secure the
conditions for their social reproduction. The combination of these factors create the conditions for the
identified politics. Drawing from the data and supporting literature, the following sub-sections cover
the precarity, mobility, and politics of holding on related to farm dwellers.
5.1. Precarity
Two-thirds of farm dwellers (66.5%) over the age of 18 have no income at all. This means that they
are unemployed, receive no social grants, and are involved in no enterprises or activities that generate
income. Of those farm dweller households in our sample that do have an income from work, social
grants or own enterprises or combinations thereof, there are significant differences in mean amounts,
with a minimum of R014, a maximum of R95,840, the mean in the first quartile R2600, in the second
quartile R4000, and in the third quartile R6600. As household sizes average 7.2 members, this means
that members of households in the first quartile have a mean allocation of R361 per member per month,
those in the second quartile a mean allocation of R555 per member per month and those in the third
quartile R917 per member per month.
Our data thus suggests that farm dwellers may be worse off than previously indicated.15
Furthermore, 75% of members in farm dweller households in our sample receive less than the
upper-bound poverty line (of R992 per person per month) in 2015 prices (Stats SA, 2017 [55]).
Stats SA (2017) reports that 55.5% of South Africans were poor in 2015, and that this rising poverty is
concentrated among children, black Africans, females, people living in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo,
and those with low educational levels. Our data shows that, by Stats SA’s definition, farm dwellers are
one of the poorest, albeit socially differentiated, social categories in the country, and that their poverty
levels and the inequalities may be obscured in national data sets. The reason for this possibly lies in
nuances revealed by distinctions in the data between individual and household incomes, primary
income sources and combined income sources and temporary, seasonal, and contract employment
along with unemployment.
Farm labour (combining permanent, temporary, and seasonal labour)16 constitutes half (49.9%) of
the primary income sources of individual farm dwellers that have an income when those who have no
income are excluded from the analysis. Wage labour is thus a very important source of income. This is
not significantly different from 51.1% of permanent farm labour reported in Visser and Ferrer (2015:
ii). However, the figure drops to 38.9% when labour (of unspecified duration) only on the farm on
which the farm dweller is resident is taken into account, as opposed to work on another farm in the
14 This was found in the case of two elderly men living alone, and who were supported with food by other farm dwellers.
They both died during the data collection process.
15 According to Visser and Ferrer drawing mainly on national databases (2015:10 [57]), the 2013 work status of people
living on farms showed 4.8% unemployed, 2.5% discouraged work seekers and 19.9% not economically active.
National unemployment figures currently stand at 27% when only active job seekers are counted and around 37% when
discouraged work seekers are included (Stats SA 2017 [55]).
16 These distinctions fluctuate over time (Bhorat et al., 2014 [92]) while the extent of casualisation is difficult to gauge because
researchers use different definitions of temporary, including blurring differences between seasonal, contract and regular
work (Visser 2016 [65]). Our data combines temporary and contract work understood as intermittent work with short-term
contracts for specific employers. Seasonal and permanent work are separate categories, with seasonal implying short-term
but seasonally regular work often for a specific task (e.g., cane cutting, planting, felling and transportation in forest
plantations) and permanent meaning on-going work for the same employer, on either a full day basis or part of a day.
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area. Furthermore, of those individual farm dwellers whose primary17 income is from farm labour,
our data shows 79.5% are permanent workers, followed by temporary or contract workers (18.9%)
with very few people stating seasonal work (1.6%) as their primary income source18. Notwithstanding
methodological and analytical differences in the studies, this is significantly less than the work of
limited or unspecified duration of 48.9%, as reported by Visser and Ferrer (2015:21 [57]) and Hall et al.,
(2013:53 [60]), and when factoring in those farm dwellers over the age of 18 who have no incomes at
all, then full-time permanent employment on the farm on which they reside is the primary income
source for just over 10% of farm dwellers.
Relatedly, incomes and their differentials also appear to have a bearing on how farm dwellers
view their relationship with farmers (something that has a bearing on the ‘politics of holding on’
section to follow). Where the distribution of the total primary income of households is relatively equal,
households are more likely to rank the relationship with the farmer as good (see Table 1). Indeed,
even where a high percentage of household incomes fall into the fourth quartile of highest incomes,
this distribution does not improve the ranking of relationship with the farmer.
Table 1. Household Primary Income Distribution V Relationship to Farmer.
Good Average Poor
Quartile 4 24.3% 32.6% 19.8%
Quartile 3 22.8% 20.1% 29.5%
Quartile 2 25.9% 26.4% 19.8%
Quartile 1 26.9% 20.8% 30.9%
Total no HH 193 288 288
The worst relationship ranking is where most of the households fall into the first income
quartile, and this indicates a significant, simmering politics of discontent surrounding farm dweller
precariousness and fragmentation.
Other primary sources of income for individual farm dwellers (excluding those in the sample who
have no income) are child grants and government old age pensions (15.9% and 13.4% respectively)
and off farm income (13.8%). While primary income sources reveal an important component of farm
dweller incomes, the diversification and combination of incomes shows the increasing importance of
multiple income sources to farm dweller livelihood strategies (see also Cousins (2013 [94]). More than
half of farm dweller households (60.6%) have more than one income source, in a range of 0 to 12,
while only 38.1% of households have a single income. The most frequently stated secondary income
source is child grants (15.3%), and the most frequent combination is mainly permanent full-time farm
work as the primary income supported by child grants. Reversals are also apparent, for example,
government old age pensions the primary income source supported by part-time work on the farm.
Other secondary income sources include other social grants (child foster grants, disability grants), own
businesses, second part-time jobs in addition to a primary job, and remittances. While work-social
grant livelihood combinations may avoid the precariousness of intermittent contracted work, very few
farm dwellers secure this combination of livelihood strategy or the alternative income source from
contracted and seasonal work opportunities19.
We thus suggest that declining permanent employment (in agriculture and industry) and modes
of labour casualisation of farm labour that exclude farm dwellers, together with uneven access to social
17 Primary income refers to the income that generates the highest amount of cash in a month.
18 This is possibly because labour contractors, who increasingly supply seasonal workers to forestry plantations (see Khosa,
2000 [93]) and sugar cane farms, do not employ farm dwellers but secure labour from off-farm locations.
19 With the increase in labour brokers, labour contractors and sub-contractors (see Khosa 2000 [93] for the forestry sector), it is
possible that farm dwellers are sidelined as a source of labour in preference to other sources of labour. However, this would
require investigation.
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grants, small (agricultural and other) businesses are resulting in social differentiation among farm
dwellers with associated fragmentation. Farm dwellers are, in other words, a poor but diversified
and socially differentiated precariat, whose best chance of survival is multiple, combined incomes
strategies, alongside mobilities, which the next sub-section indicates.
5.2. Mobility
The social dynamics underlying mobility can be analysed in terms of centrifugal or push factors
(moving from a central zone to another periphery, i.e., from the farm dwelling to town) and the converse
centripetal forces (attractive qualities operating at destination peripheries that attract individuals to
them (Colby, 1933 [95]) or pull factors back to the farms. The data indicates that farm dweller mobility
falls into three distinct types: eviction, constructive eviction, and voluntary migration. In the latter
case, migration involves both movements off the farm, as well as movements back to the farm.
Regarding prospective evictions, 7.1% of individual farm dwellers20 have had permission to
reside on the farm withdrawn, with 76% of these taking place after 2005. This is the first step hat
a farmer is obliged to take in order to secure an explicit, or legal eviction.21 The reasons given by
land owners for withdrawing permission vary (as Table 2 below shows), although in most cases farm
dwellers said farmers simply said farm dwellers should make their homes somewhere else.
Table 2. Reasons for farmer withdrawing permission vs. Age category.
Make a Home
Elsewhere
Person Working
Elsewhere
Misdemeanor
Committed No Reason Other Total
Younger than 18 30 0 2 3 6 41
18–35 years 59 4 4 26 8 101
36–60 years 37 10 4 25 10 86
Older than 60 8 0 0 3 4 15
Total 134 14 10 57 28 243
Despite having their permission to be on the farm withdrawn, not all of the affected farm dwellers
have moved off the farm. As Table 3 below shows, of those whose permission to be on the farm has
been withdrawn over half (53%) stay home most nights. Perhaps more striking than the impending
potential evictions is that of the many individuals who said that they have the farmer’s permission
to be on the farm, nearly a third (31%) do not stay at home most nights, suggesting that more farm
dwellers are leaving farms, at least temporarily, for reasons other than an explicit eviction.
Table 3. Permission to stay on the farm vs Stays home most nights.
Permission to Stay on
the Farm Withdrawn
Has Permission to
Stay on the Farm Total
Stays home most nights 178 3045 3223
Not home most nights 135 1063 1198
Total 313 4108 4421
Evictions can also take a ‘constructive’ form. Legal, explicit eviction procedures, which require a court
order, alternative accommodation and reporting to the Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform and the local municipality, can be onerous and expensive for the landowner (AFRA, 2017 [89]).
20 The data on withdrawn permission was collected for all people over the age of 18 rather than at household level because
young adults have reported to AFRA that they are particularly vulnerable to eviction.
21 In terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA, 1997), explicit evictions involve legal processes in which
landowners withdraws the farm dwellers’ right to occupy the land, for reasons that include termination of labour, violations
of farm rules by the farm dweller, or the landowner’s intention to make productive use of the land occupied by the farm.
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As a result, some farmers pressure farm dwellers to vacate on-farm residences. Constructive evictions
thus refer to processes whereby the landowner puts pressure on the farm dweller with the intention of
pushing him or her to decide to abandon the property. They can take many forms that are designed
to compel farm dwellers to ‘decide’ to leave the farm, including acts of omission (withdrawing access
to basic needs such as water or energy resources), or more explicit acts of commission (fencing in the
household and depriving children of access to roads needed to get to schools (Reilly, 2014 [96]), or refusing
occupiers permission to renovate their houses, even at their own cost and in an effort to create habitable
living environments for their families that secure human dignity22).
Omission of services is a common impetus for constructive evictions, and this is reflected in
the relationship between farmers and farm dwellers. Table 4 shows that the higher the number of
households that have access to a bundle of goods (including access to electricity, water and toilet,
the presence of family graves on the farm, and the right to have visitors), the higher the probability
that farm dwellers will rank their relationship with the farmer as good. Similarly, if a higher number
of farm dwellers do not have access to the bundle of goods, then the relationship is ranked as poor.
We assume that a poor relationships with farmers are more likely to result in conditions giving rise to
constructive evictions, than where relationships are good. However, the relationship to farmer trends
suggested by access to a bundle of services, while present, is not strong.23
Table 4. Relationship to farmer V Access to bundle of goods.
Relationship to Farmer Good Average Poor Total HH
Access to service: Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1. Electricity 134 59 167 121 109 179 410 359
2. Water 178 14 263 25 249 39 690 78
3. Toilet 126 66 191 96 121 167 438 329
4. Have graves 88 105 121 167 173 115 382 387
5. Allowed visitors 186 7 259 28 248 40 693 75
TOTAL 712 251 1001 437 900 540 2613 1228
As % 73.9 26.1 69.6 30.4 62.5 37.5 68 32
Evictions, constructive or explicit, are not the only reason farm dwellers leave farms, as centrifugal
forces are at play. Of the 31% of adult farm dwellers who have the landowner’s permission to live on
the farm but do not stay on the farm most nights, nearly half (41.6%) left because they have found work
elsewhere, followed by a third (32.1%) who went to live with relatives living elsewhere, sometimes in
order to provide support to those relatives. It is also possible that while some respondents stated that
various household members had gone to live with other relatives, they had in fact been told by the
farmer that they should leave the farm.24 As Table 5 below shows, there is a gendered dimension to
this centrifugal mobility, with more men (61.6%) than women (38.8%) leaving for reasons of finding
work elsewhere, while many more women left the farm for reasons of marriage (86.3% compared
to 13.7% of men) or to live with families elsewhere (57.4% of women compared with 48.6% of men).
Finding work elsewhere was the most frequently given reason given by men for leaving the farm
22 In the Constitutional Court case (Daniels v Scribante and Another 2017 ZACC 13, five judges ordered that the farm dweller,
Daniels, be allowed to effect renovations to her home at her own cost. They argued that “there can be no true security of tenure
under conditions devoid of human dignity”, and that to fail to grant permission to renovate could inadvertently facilitate an
illegal eviction because the living conditions are “intolerable”.
23 Just over a quarter of households who rank their relationship to the farmer as good do not have access to a bundle of services,
while nearly two-thirds of farm dwellers who rank the relationship with the farmer as poor do have access to a bundle
of services. In some respects, this indicates a methodological difficulty in researching the conditions that give rise to
constructive evictions, as pressures exerted by land owners on farm dwellers to leave the farm can take many forms and
different actions may be interpreted differently by farm dwellers and farmers.
24 This interpretation, which emerged in discussion with AFRA staff, was not canvassed in the survey, however.
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(61.6%), whereas going to live with relatives was the most frequent reason women had for leaving the
farm (32.1%).
Table 5. Gender of farm dwellers with permission to be on the farm who have left.
Male/Female Breakdown Breakdown of Samples by Gender
Reasons for leaving the farm Females Male Female sample Male sample
Found work elsewhere 38.3% 61.6% 173 (31%) 278 (52.8%)
Left to live with relatives elsewhere 57.4% 48.6% 179 (32.1%) 169 (32.1%)
To continue education 46.6% 53.4% 48 (8.6%) 55 (10.4%)
To get married 86.3% 13.7% 157 (28.2%) 25 (4.7%)
Total (of 1084) 52% 48% 557 (100%) 527 (100%)
There is also a significant gender-generational nexus to those that are leaving farms for the
purpose of working elsewhere. More than half (58%) are young men that are below the age of 35.
This is probably due to a combination of factors, including that young adult men do not have social
grants to reduce their income vulnerability and that women are more likely than men to be expected
to undertake family duties where there is a need for support and care.
Centripetal forces also operate to draw farm dwellers back to the farm in migration patterns that
are often described as circulatory. A perhaps surprising feature of the data is the high preponderance
of young adults who are on the farm. As Figure 1 below shows, 71% of young adults between the
ages of 18 and 35 stay at home most nights. Although most of the people leaving farms for work
elsewhere are young men in this age group, the size of this age group on farms together with the high
proportion who have no income from any source suggests that this is the most vulnerable sub-group
in the agricultural precariat, and that residence on farms is the best of their a very limited range of
options for living.
Anecdotal evidence from AFRA (Sithole, 2017 [97]) suggests that this growing population
of younger adults, many of whom are better educated than their parents and who have a better
understanding of their legal rights, is a source of friction on farms. Whereas, older generations tend
to adhere to the farm rules, younger adults are more willing to confront farmers around what they
view as unreasonable actions. In a particular case in the Umgungundlovu District, the farmer locked
the gate and prevented a farm dweller household from admitting visitors who had arrived by car to
attend a ceremonial family function. The younger adults eventually cut the lock, which resulted in
a confrontation with the farmer, who had a firearm, and his wife. The conflict was recorded on phone
video and sent to AFRA. Strikingly, the farmer asserted his right to lock the gate on the basis that
“This farm is mine. I have a title deed”, to which the young farm dwellers in the dispute responded:
“This is our home. This is where we live”. We turn now to consider further these centripetal forces of
that pull farm dweller back to homes on farms, or the politics of holding on to the land.
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Figure 1. Age Category of Adult Farm Dwellers Home Most Nights.
5.3. The Politics of Holding on to the Land
A significant number of households, and in particular, young adult members of households,
remain on farms, despite difficult and worsening living conditions, which contradicts the processes
of “rural hollowing” (Liu et al., 2010 [98]) that an over-simplified analysis of the push-pull migratory
trends would suggest. Farms are neighborhoods that constitute the foundations of well-being and
identity of those who grow up on them (AFRA, 2005 [99]). Together with deep connections to graves
and the recreation of these links through ongoing burial practices, “[1] and ties people to their histories”
(Greenberg, 2015: 975 [2]), and this is an important centripetal force to take note of. Our data shows
that farm dwellers assert ‘home’ as a place that belongs to them, based on histories to specific land that
are re-enacted through ceremonies in the present, along with entitled remuneration for a life of labour.
Dynamics of belonging are multi-faceted. Despite restricted financial resources, Mosoetsa
(2011 [100]), in a study of home, shows that familial solidarity is not compromised in settlements on
the periphery of cities in KwaZulu-Natal, and is expressed as “eating from one pot”. The reference to
food as an anchor for the farm dweller family is also supported by the data, which indicates that 69%
of households cultivate gardens on the farm and 44% own some livestock.25 History and length of
occupation on the farm also play a role, as Figure 2 below shows. Nearly 70% of households (69.6%)
arrived on the farm where they live before 1994, with 59% of those stating that the family had either
always lived on the farm, or that one or both of their father and grandfather had been born on the
farm. There is a key correspondence between when a household came to live on a farm and who they
believe will take over the home on the death of the household head.
The majority of respondents who came to live on the farm before 1994 said family would take
over the house on the death of the head of house, whereas most of the respondents who came to live
on the farm after 1994 stated that the farmer would take over the house. The reasons given by those
who say a family member will take over the house include that they have always lived in the house
and that they have no house elsewhere. A life of labour without adequate remuneration was also
a justification. As one respondent stated: “My husband worked on this farm all his life and when he
died, there was no pension. So I took this house to be his pension”.
25 Visser and Ferrer (2015 [57]), however, have disputed the emphasis NGOs place on farm dwellers’ security of tenure and
argue that labour conditions and housing constitute the key concerns of farm workers.
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Figure 2. What will happen to the house V When the family came to this farm.
There are ties between family and home in the data. 82.2% of farm dwellers who live in single
room houses believe that the farmer will take over the house, whereas 78.7% of those who live in houses
with five rooms or more said that family would take over the house, with only 0.06% stating that the
farmer would take over. This corresponds with the presence of family on the farm as single-room
quarters invariably (77%) have two or fewer occupants in them, whereas 87% of houses with more
than five rooms are occupied by households with six or more family members. Households that have
lived on the farm since before 1994 thus tend to be bigger and have more rooms, suggesting that these
are homes for families.
While length of residence and presence of family is important to a notion of home, belonging is
forged through keeping the link between identity and place alive in the present. This can be seen in
the data on graves. Just over half of farm dweller households (422) have graves on the farm where
they live. Hornby (2015 [101]) shows that ceremonial practices on farms in KwaZulu-Natal around the
deceased are drawn-out, extended affairs that are located in specific homestead spaces and involve
animal slaughter, communication with ancestors, and participation of extended family and community.
The entanglement of graves, land, family, and community possibly explains why burials hold such
potential for conflict between farmers and farm dwellers. Of the 99 households that are no longer
allowed to bury on the farm, 46.6% judged their relationship with the farmer as ‘poor’ and only 6%
said they had a ‘good’ relationship (60% of households that assessed their relationship with the farmer
as being ‘poor’ have graves on the farm). This suggests not so much a process of constructive eviction
as a process of constricting the space and normative activities that underpin ‘home’ for farm dwellers.
This constriction of home-life could result in farm dwellers either abandoning homes on farms or
defending homes on farms in order to secure the ceremonial and other social reproductive activities
necessary for making homes.
Tying this together with unemployment figures and the on-farm household demographics that
are shown above, the conclusion is that a large number of residences on farms are not housing for farm
workers, but homes for families who have lived on the farm for 24 years and longer. These individuals
expect that their homes will remain theirs into the future, and who continue to construct ‘home’
through ceremonial activities such as burials. However, this conclusion is contrary both to farm tenure
legislation as well as the conclusions drawn by Visser and Ferrer (2015 [57]).26 While we do not dispute
Visser and Ferrer’s conclusion that that “[e]xtending on-farm tenure security and protection from
26 As noted above, the ESTA closely links farm wage work with on-farm residence, placing the tenure of the farm dweller at
risk if their employment is terminated (see AFRA, 2017 [89]). Visser and Ferrer (2015: 85 [57]) argue further that the state
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eviction is no longer the single, biggest need of farm workers” (ibid: v1) and that farm workers are an
increasingly diverse group with a range of livelihood and tenure needs, our argument is that the farm
is nevertheless “home” for a significant proportion of rural dwellers, many of whom do not secure
their primary income from farm work.
We thus propose that farm dwellers are asserting a politics of home, of belonging to the land,
as a counter response to what Barchiesi (2011 [102]) argues is the disciplining effects of the normative
nexus of employment and citizenship that underpins South Africa’s “precarious liberation”. Unable to
secure regular or ‘decent’ employment in the ‘new’ South Africa, some farm dwellers hang on to
‘home’ as a silent expression of a ‘subaltern politics’ (Spivak 1998 [103]). This politics arises from
national and global drivers of agrarian change, but it also stands in tension to them.27 Moreover this
subaltern politics constitutes the social force, together with increasingly constrained livelihood options,
which could potentially activate a local politics that focuses on farm dweller precarity. With an
understanding of structural changes in the agrarian sector and their relation to farm dweller’s
distributed precarity and ‘holding on’ to land, we turn to consider the second component of the
‘double burden’ related to climate change risks and their implications for farm dwellers.
6. A Slipping Hold? The Risk of a Double Exposure for Farm Dwellers
Climatic changes that were observed in the province over the past 50 years include general
warming (Hewitson et al. 2005; Schulze 2005, CSAG 2017 [33,104,105]), with weather stations along
the coast reporting temperature increases of over 2 ◦C/century, more than twice the global rate of
temperature increase (CSAG 2017 [105]). Hewitson et al., 2005, amongst other climate change studies
(including Schulze 2005 [104]; CSAG 2017 [105]) identify the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands as one of
three climate change hotspots in South Africa. This is because the warming already observed and the
projected changes in climate have expected impacts on people, ecosystems and economies.
The important derived trends projected into the future (CSAG 2017, Zierwogel 2014 [19,105])
for the purposes of this article are: firstly, an increase in the annual maximum mean temperatures,
particularly over the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands and the north-eastern parts of the province; secondly,
an increase in heat units in the summer months across the province; thirdly, an increase in heat units in
the winter months along the coast and inland to the Pietermaritzburg area, and finally, an increase in
the annual means of minimum temperatures. The projected result of warming is changes in weather
patterns with expected increases and variability in the amounts of precipitation coupled with changes in
seasonality. These are likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the intensity of extreme
events such as floods, tropical cyclones, storm surges, heat waves and droughts. While statistically
there exists no clear evidence of substantial changes in annual precipitation totals, seasonal total
rainfall or daily rainfall extremes there is consensus that there is a general wetting trend over KZN,
a phenomenon supported by modelling data in the 2017 draft of the Third National Communication
Report to the United Nations Framework. Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The localized
analysis of the extended Long Term Adaptation Scenarios (LTAS) data set for 1960–2015 indicates
significant positive trends in annual rainfall in the south of KZN and negative trends in the north
(CSAG, 2017 [105]).
With these changes in mind, O’Brien’s notion of double exposure is useful in approaching both
the risk that farm dwellers will be affected by climate change at the household level at the same time
as they are affected by a changing agrarian political economy, and that climate change and agrarian
change may interact to amplify farm dweller vulnerability. According to McDowell et al., (2010 [106]),
focus on litigation to prevent evictions is “misplaced” because movement off farms is the “inevitable” result of agricultural
“modernisation” and tenure security without a livelihood is “not sufficient”.
27 Greenberg (2015 [2]) argues that these ties to the land and the conflict skewed ownership will produce constitutes a political
imperative for land reform while the potential of agrarian reform to create small scale farming as an alternative to wage
employment is an economic imperative for land reform.
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there are a variety of ways to understand and apply the concept of vulnerability, from a principally
biophysical focus on climatic exposures to the concept of “social vulnerability” that exists, regardless
of climatic conditions (Adger and Kelly 1999 [107], Kelly and Adger 2000 [108]). Erratic rainfall
constitutes a significant biophysical risk to food security for those approximately 69% of farm dwellers
in the sample supplementing their diets with home gardens. There are likely to be increased public
health risks for those approximately 30% of residents with poor service access—especially to water
borne diseases when faced with poor sanitation and water sources. Vulnerability studies assessing
the level of risk should an extreme weather event occur indicate that KwaZulu-Natal has the highest
human vulnerability to climatic events (Jansen Van Vuuren cited in Thornhill et al, 2009: 51 [82]).
The province’s high level of human-climate vulnerability is closely associated with the high poverty
levels and population densities coupled by high levels of land degradation (ibid).
While taking full cognizance of the importance of considering biophysical exposures, including
extremes, such as flooding and drought, scholars (Adger and Kelly 1999 [107] Kelly and Adger 2000 [108]
and Turner et al., 2003 [109]) posit that a focus solely on external stressors is insufficient in explaining how
a population is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity (Fussel and Klein 2006 [110]). Low level
social and economic conditions of a population, such as the precariat within the farm dweller sample,
render it vulnerable, even in the absence of actual climatic events. In fact, McDowell et al., (2010 [106])
go as far as to say that the ability of a population to deal with biophysical exposures is a function of its
social vulnerability. The sample can be interpreted as fitting with her framework of social determinants
of individual vulnerability. These include low social status, lack of access to resources such as land
(with farm dwellers lowest on the priority list for land restitution and redistribution (Hall et al., 2013 [60]),
and a lack of diversity of income sources (high levels of no income combined with dependency on farm
wage income and child grants). A lack of stable off-farm income for young adults in cities in a context of
high unemployment also limit alternative—or multiple—livelihood strategies. Therefore, the on-going
precarity of farm dweller livelihoods is the foundation for future climatic shocks because it increases their
sensitivity to climate events and lowers their adaptive capacity.
A second set of dynamics relates to the implications for farm dwellers of climate change impacts
at farm or regional/national scales, as well as those implications of mitigation or adaptation strategies
on the part of farmers and government. The awareness and evidence base of these factors is nascent.
Officially, however, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEA, 2013 [111]) has identified
agriculture as a sector highly vulnerable to climate change, and expects to see a reduction of 3.5% to
4.3%, respectively, in total average maize and wheat yields for the median impact scenario by 2050,
with impacts on food production, agricultural livelihoods, and food security of a magnitude to be of
national policy concern (DEA, 2013 [111]). Studies that were conducted by Turpie and Visser (2013 [65])
project costs to farmers of climate change to be R694 billion rand by 2080 (although KwaZulu-Natal is
less severe than other provinces). This is likely to exacerbate the winners and drop-outs from commercial
agriculture that were identified by Ewert and Du Toit (2007 [45]) above, entrenching and deepening farmers’
responses identified by Genis (2015 [73]), including labour shedding. The climate trends highlighted above,
and in particular recent extreme weather events such as drought and floods, have already started having
a bearing on the day-to-day decision-making processes of farmers. Hewitson et al. (2005 [33]) and
Schulze (2005 [104]) suggest that these events are affecting farmers’ selection of cultivars, irrigation regimes,
fertilizer, and pesticide applications, as well as number of farm employees, although Genis (2015 [73])
attributes these decisions to increased competition. An incidence of the knock on effects for the employment
in KZN of labour reductions was evident in the sugar cane industry, where, largely in response to the
2016/17 drought, saw a decline of 14.1% in total number of workers on cane farms as compared with the
previous year (Canegrowers 2017: 20 [84]).28
28 A survey the Canegrowers’ Association undertook of large scale canegrowers in 2015/6 indicated that inflation adjusted revenue
was 11% lower than the previous season, attributed to drought, and that growers may have reduced staff or hours as a cost-saving
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Such impacts beg the question of what is to be done. Mitigation strategies that were identified by
DEA include building more sustainable production, enabling farmers to access more formal markets
and finance, and incentivising carbon sequestration and climate smart agriculture (DEA, 2013 [111]).29
While the adoption of ‘biological’ farming practices (such as drip irrigation and zero till cultivation)
are championed and have their place, purely technological approaches lack analytical integration
of how vulnerability is either mitigated or exacerbated by the structural changes of the past
35 years, which largely entailed consolidation and expansion. Expansion of production can be
a climate-mitigating strategy depending on the commodity produced.30 For example, goats in bush
encroached communal areas may serve to control bush encroachment where it is beginning to displace
grasslands (Alcock 2017 [112]). However, the expansion of plantations—for example, sugar and
timber—is also likely to put pressure on diminishing ground water resources and increase crop
yield vulnerability to intermittent drought, increased temperatures, and climate change induced crop
diseases. In parts of the Umgungundlovu District, the plantation expansions of the global corporate,
Mondi, have brought it into conflict with farm dwellers that are resident on the land it leases around
eviction threats, diminished access to services, land for small farm production (Ziqubu 2017 [113]),
and reduced opportunities for waged employment and contracting (Khosa 2000 [93]).
In relation to this, climate justice, food and agroecology activists (amongst others, Holt-Giménez
and Altieri (2013 [40]) and Van Der Ploeg et al., 2015 [35]) argue that the expansion of land-holdings in
response to competition (CF Genis 2015 [73]) and the increase of monoculture plantations in agriculture,
create food security and climate related risks, and constrain adaptive responses to technological
innovation and bioengineering. Their contention, fitting with O’Brien and Leichenko (2000 [22]), is that
the social impacts of environmental distress are unevenly distributed across space and social groups,
and that, in line with McDowell et al., 2010 [106], such strategies are in themselves maladaptive as
they increase the vulnerability of other systems, sectors, or social groups (McDowell et al., 2010 [106]).
Such perspectives emphasise the need for a politics that enhances food and livelihood security
at the household level for farm dwellers. Yet, the current land reform dispensation and agrarian
trajectory that benefits elites rather than the rural poor (Hall and Kepe 2017 [116]) seems to preclude
this eventuality. In this context, the land question remains a central and politically contested issue,
and in particular, whether there is place for farm dwellers to own commercial farms? The shift in
redistribution policy focus away from poor people who need land for multiple purposes, together with
the government’s failure to develop a comprehensive tenure reform policy (Hornby et al., 2017 [1]),
has meant that farm dwellers are no longer a policy priority for commercial farmland acquisition.
Indeed, their tenure appears to have become more insecure with an escalation of evictions during
post-Apartheid South Africa (Mntungwa 2014 [117]; Wegerif et al., 2010 [3]).
7. Conclusions
This paper set out that intersections between climate change risk, capital, and precarity are
playing out at a farm-dweller household level in Kwazulu-Natal. Initially, we set out how structural
change in the agricultural sector has created a diversified agricultural precariat. Farm dwellers are
primarily a group of wageless, income-less adults, whose lives are precarious in that high levels of
unemployment co-exist with declining permanent farm work and extremely limited and intermittent
measure in response to the drought. Wage costs per ton of cane attributed to seasonal workers constitute 18.8% of the total wage
bill, suggesting a significant proportion of low skill workers are seasonal (Canegrowers 2017 [84]).
29 Deressa et al (2005 [114]) for instance found that irrigation was ineffective as a KZN adaptation strategy for sugarcane,
and that adaptation strategies should focus special attention on technologies and management regimes that will enhance
sugarcane tolerance to warmer temperatures during winter and especially the harvesting phases.
30 Vertical integration can be an adaptive responses in terms of enhancing employment, particularly into downstream
value-adding processes in the timber sector (National Planning Commission (NPC) 2011 [115]). Khosa (2000 [93]) also shows
that there are opportunities in forestry for small contractors and sub-contractors. However, agro-processing can also be
a major contributor to water and air pollution, as well as major user of water and fuel inputs.
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seasonal and contract work. Furthermore, farm dwellers are evidence of labour fragmentation, in that
those who do have incomes secure them from multiple sources in a variety of combinations, with signs
of emerging social differentiation being indicated in uneven distributions of income at both individual
and household levels. Income precariousness is compounded by insecure tenure in the form of explicit
and constructive evictions. This results in often circular migration to towns, where an absence of
employment opportunities pushes people back home and generates a politics of holding on to home
on the farms. Here, the concept of land as lived home space occupied by farm dwellers co-exists with
the farm as landed property that is owned by the farmer. We see this as the expression of a subaltern
politics that constitutes part of the social forces that activate ‘land’ as a politics of place and home and
not simply as a site of production.
While in the main we demonstrate, based on our study sample, that this hold is tenuous,
an additional concern in the context of this special issue is whether climate change exacerbates
or the further causes the hold to slip? While there is as yet little evidence in the literature for claiming
climate change impacts on agriculture in KZN or farm labour, and given that attribution is difficult
in complex agrarian contexts, we suggest that the need to take into account climate related risks to
an already precarious population is compelling. Here, we attempted to substantiate that the risk of
a double burden for a rural farm dweller precariat is substantial. The structural trends in post-apartheid
South Africa, which is characterised by a concentration on the part of capitalist agriculture, and a land
reform dispensation that does not take into account farm dwellers, might be construed to constrain
responses to climate change that could mitigate farm dweller vulnerability.
In contrast to these risks and vulnerabilities, we advocate an enabling politics and an agrarian
plan that explicitly aims to mitigate this precarity and vulnerability, and beyond to create positive
trajectories for change. Li (2015: 80 [54]) hints at this kind of progressive biopolitics, envisioning that
“In a democratic system, and within the container of the nation state, tensions between productivity and
protection may be worked out by means of the ballot and are embedded in laws that define entitlements
and—just as important—a sense of entitlement that is not easy to eradicate”. Agrarian reform
that puts farm dwellers at its centre is precisely such a legal entitlement arising from within the
democratic system and that ‘works out’ some of the tensions between productivity and protection.
Ferguson (2015 [118]) agrees that land reform is important for this reason. South Africa’s property
clause in the Constitution gives effect to this. The Constitution protects rights to property. This is
often interpreted as protection of rights to ownership, whereas land reform laws (especially ESTA
and the labour tenants legislation) make clear that rights of occupation are a form of statutory
property right. A transfer of such farm dweller rights to land could be undertaken with compensation
only for the difference between the full bundle of ownership rights and these rights of occupation.
Equal land distribution has a potential to provide vulnerable communities a platform to actively
exercise their agro-economic activities. Therefore, secure land rights in conjunction with micro-scale
farmer supporter, has the potential to bring about greater justice and equity (Greenberg, 2015 [2]), and,
we argue, greater livelihood resilience.
In concert with Ewert and Du Toit (2005 [45]), we argue that a broader approach to pro-poor
policies and citizen empowerment is necessary to address the problems on farms. The question is
whether the social conditions identified, in particular the fragmentation of farm dwellers as a result of
diversified income and income strategies, create the conditions for a politics to pursue the interests
of farm dwellers? We argue that these conditions are emerging, in that an increasing number of
young farm dwellers constitute the precariat on farms, and this constituency both understands its
rights and is more likely to assert them. Furthermore, the circulatory migration pattern means they
are potentially connected with the urban precariat in shack settlements and inner city abandoned
buildings, thus creating the potential for alliances around a disruptive politics. Whether climate change
will lend further impetus to this politics, or exacerbate and engender a ‘slipping hold’ will be key for
rural farm dweller futures.
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